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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992), as a final order of a court
of record over which the Utah Court of Appeals did not have original
jurisdiction.
The clerk of the Utah Supreme Court gave notice that this
appeal had been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Utah

Supreme Court has discretion to make such transfer under Rule 42,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it

granted Robert M. Mills and Donna H. Mills summary judgement without
considering disputes of material facts contained in the parties
affidavits.
The standard of appellate review for this issue is
correctness,

without

determinations.

deference

to

the

trial

court's

legal

It is well-established that appellate courts in

Utah give no deference to the trial court's fact findings and
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding.
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah

Canfield v.

App. 1992).

Additionally, the evidence must be considered in a light most
favorable to the losing party in a summary judgement proceeding.

1

We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and affirm only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact, or where,
even according to the facts as contended by the losing party,
the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.
Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979) .
2.

Did

the

trial

court

commit

reversible

error

in

interpreting an unclear, incomplete and ambiguous contract in a
summary judgement proceeding.
The

standard

correctness,

of

without

determinations.

appellate
deference

review
to

the

for
trial

this

issue

court's

is

legal

It is well-established that appellate courts in

Utah give no deference to the trial court's fact findings and
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding.
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah
3.

Canfield v.

App. 1992).

Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing to

recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah.
The

standard

correctness,

of

without

determinations.

appellate
deference

review
to

the

for
trial

this

issue

court's

is

legal

It is well-established that appellate courts in

Utah give no deference to the trial court' s fact findings and
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding.
Albertsonsr 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah

2

App. 1992).

Canfield v.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On March 16, 1995, Appellees Robert M. and Donna H. Mills
("Appellees") filed a Complaint against Appellant Jana Jean Brody
for unlawful detainer. The Complaint alleged that Appellant failed
to vacate the premises of the condominium at issue in this case.
On April 5, 1995, Appellant filed an Answer and Counterclaim and
subsequent Amended Counterclaim alleging that Appellees' refusal to
sell the condominium constituted a breach of the option to purchase
contract that the parties had signed on February 3, 1993.

The

claims asserted by both parties in this case arose out of a lease
agreement and option to purchase contract which the parties signed
on February 3, 1993. *
On July 26, 1995, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted Appellees'
Motion for Summary Judgement after finding that Appellant violated
the terms of the lease agreement by failing to vacate the premises
and that Appellant did not timely exercise the option to purchase
because the contract required payment of the entire purchase price
within the option period.

The trial court ordered Appellant to

vacate the premises before August 1, 1995 and to pay a total
judgement of $21,416.00, which consisted of rental fees, treble

1

The only evidence presented at the hearing for Appellees'
Motion for Summary Judgment was the lease and option to purchase
and the parties' affidavits.
3

damages, court costs and attorney's fees.

This appeal was timely

filed on August 16, 1995.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Appellant, Jana Jean Brody, signed a valid and enforceable
lease with an option to purchase Appellees', Robert M. and Donna H.
Mills, condominium on or about February 3rd, 1993. A
lease and option to purchase are attached as Exhibit

copy of the

#1. Under the

terms of the option to purchase, Appellant had a twenty-four month
option to purchase Appellees' condominium located at 1593 East 6430
South, Holladay, Utah ("condominium").
There is no clause in the option to purchase which required
full payment at the time of acceptance.

Additionally,

there was

no oral agreement between the parties that required payment in full
at the time of acceptance. The option to purchase was exercised by
Appellant's husband, Pat Brody, both by a telephone conversation
which took place on February 9, 1995 and a written correspondence
dated February 10, 1995, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit #2.
In the letter, Appellant's husband

informed Appellees that they

were prepared to close the transaction at any time.

Appellees

informed Appellant that they would not return to Salt Lake City,
Utah, from a two-year mission for their church until mid-March and
would prefer to "close" at that time.

See Affidavit of Pat Brody

15 7-10, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit # 3

4

Appellant and Appellees subsequently agreed to close between
March 20 and March 24, 1995.

See Affidavit of Pat Brody

II 8 &

9. Merrill Title Company of Midvale, Utah was notified of the
closing date and a file was opened to complete the transaction
between the parties.

See Affidavit of Pat Brody I 11. Appellees

have refused to perform the option to purchase contract.

See Pat

Brody's Affidavit I 12.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Court erred by granting summary judgement in a
case where the affidavits and pleadings clearly show that genuine
issues of material facts exist.

The affidavits reveal several

genuine issues of material facts, including whether the option to
purchase was modified and extended for Appellees' convenience,
whether the option to purchase required payment in full by February
15, 1995, and whether the option to purchase was properly exercised
when Appellant contacted Appellees before the original expiration
of the option. Additionally, the trial court erred by interpreting
an incomplete and ambiguous contract at the summary judgement stage.
The option to purchase did not state whether the entire purchase
price had to be rendered to exercise the option.

Further, the

option did not include a integrated clause and Appellees presented
no evidence that the option was intended to be an integrated and
complete contract. The trial court also committed manifest error

5

when it failed to recognize equitable estoppel and part performance
as defenses to the statute of frauds under Utah law,

ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED UNDER UTAH LAW THAT IT IS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGEMENT UNLESS THERE ARE NO
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT,
The trial court committed manifest error when it granted

summary judgement despite there being several disputed issues of
material facts. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
clear that summary judgement is improper when issues of material
fact exist.
The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
Pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
Utah R. of Civ. P. 56(c).

See also Young v. Felorniaf 244 P. 2d 862

(Utah 1952) (stating that under Rule 56(c) it is clear that if there
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion should be
denied).
In the present case, Appellant's husband, Pat Brody, and
Appellee, Robert Mills, filed Affidavits with their memorandum in
connection with the summary judgement proceeding.

A copy of the

Affidavit of Robert Mills is attached as Exhibit #5. The Affidavits
and pleading reveal at least the following genuine issues of
material fact:
6

1.

Whether the option to purchase was modified and extended

to the week of March 21, 1995, for Appellees' convenience.
2.

Whether the option to purchase, by its terms or by oral

agreement, required payment in full before February 15, 1995.
3.

Whether the option to purchase was properly exercised

when Appellant contacted Appellees by telephone and in writing
before the original expiration of the option.
4.

Whether

Appellees

acknowledged

that

Appellant

had

exercised the option to purchase in the phone conversation which
took place on February 9, 1995.
5.

Whether Appellees told Appellant in that same phone

conversation that immediate payment was not necessary and that they
could "close" when they returned from their mission after the
original expiration.
All reasonably disputed issues of material fact must be
construed in favor of the party being moved against, as well as all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from factual statements
such as those put forth by Appellant's Affidavit.

W.M. Barnes Co.

v. Sohio National Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1981).
Additionally, it is not in the judge's discretion at the summary
judgement stage to weigh the credibility of the parties or the
evidence.

Id.

The Affidavits in this case contain disputed facts that
preclude summary judgement because the facts are material to the
outcome of the case.

For example, the trial court ruled that
7

Appellant did not timely exercise the option when there is ambiguity
as to the facts and intentions of the parties on this issue.
When the facts alleged by Appellant's Affidavit are construed
in her favor, it is clear that Appellees were not entitled to
judgement as a matter of law and summary judgement was improper in
this case. The trial court's judgement was therefore manifest error
and Appellant prays the Court to remand the case for a proper
determination on the merits.

II.

A TRIAL COURT MAY ONLY INTERPRET A CONTRACT ON A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WHEN IT IS COMPLETE, CLEAR, AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
The trial court committed manifest error in interpreting an

ambiguous contract instead of allowing it to go to a jury for
interpretation.

The trial court should have allowed the case to

proceed to trial to determine whether there was any extrinsic
evidence to clear up the ambiguities in the option to purchase.
The Supreme Court of Utah has made the following statement
about a trial court's discretion in interpreting contracts at the
summary judgement stage:
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous
can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary
judgement . . . . If the evidence as to the terms of an
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the
terms of the agreement is to be determined by the jury.
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah
1986) (citing Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph

8

Co. ,

658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983); Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design
Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981)).
The option to purchase was unclear, ambiguous and incomplete
as to whether the entire purchase price had to be rendered to
exercise

the option.

The option

also does

not

include an

integration clause and Appellees presented no evidence that the
option was intended to be an integrated and complete contract.
An unintegrated contract may exist where the terms are not
ambiguous, but the nature of the agreement itself is unclear.

Id.

Extrinsic evidence should be allowed to determine if the option is
a clear and comprehensive integration of the parties' intent.
The trial court committed manifest error when it ruled the
entire purchase price was required before the original option
period expired where the contract is unclear,
incomplete.

ambiguous and

The Appellant respectfully asks the Court to remand

the case for proper factual determinations on these issues.

III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE ARE VALID DEFENSE TO
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN UTAH.
The trial court also committed manifest error in failing to
recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah.

The Supreme Court of

Utah first recognized the defense of equitable estoppel in a 1970
case where the exercise of an option contract was similarly at
issue.
9

An option to purchase is an interest in real estate and is
within the statute of frauds. An extension of a contract
which is required to be in writing is not enforceable, by the
majority rule, in the absence of an estoppelf if it does not
comply with the statute of frauds.
Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Utah has defined equitable estoppel as
follows:
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three
elements: (i) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission,
act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party
that would result from allowing the first party to contradict
or repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act.
Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah
1989)(citing Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n,
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)).
Each of the elements of equitable estoppel were alleged by
Appellant's Affidavit in this case. Specifically, Appellees sought
to

modify

convenience.

and

extend

the option

to purchase

for their own

When Appellant's husband informed Appellees of their

acceptance of the option to purchase, Appellees told him that it
would be more convenient to close the transaction when they returned
to Salt Lake the third week of March, 1995.

Both parties orally

agreed to postpone the closing date until the Appellees returned to
Utah.
Appellant relied on this representation by contacting a title
and setting up a closing date of the third week of March, 1995.
10

Further, Appellant made no further attempts to close until Appellees
returned despite the fact that they could have closed before
February 15, 1995.

Appellant's husband informed Appellees in the

February 10, 1995 letter that they were exercising the option and
could close "at any time."
As

a

result

of

her

representations, Appellant was

reliance
injured.

on

Appellees'

oral

She was denied the

opportunity to purchase the property where she and her husband
resided

for two years and had always planned on purchasing.

Appellant and her husband lost equity that had a substantial value.
Also, in anticipation of owning the condominium, Appellant has made
improvements to the property at a substantial cost.
This Court recently noted that it may apply the doctrine of
part performance to enforce, by estoppel, an oral agreement that
would otherwise be precluded by the statute of frauds.
Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Ut.App. 1994).

Green v.

In Allen v. Kingdom,

723 P. 2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court also
recognized part performance as an exception to the statute of
frauds; "where a party has changed position by performing an oral
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the other
party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement as
modified."
Additionally, U.C.A. § 25-5-3 provides that nothing in the
chapter on statute of frauds "shall be construed to abridge the

11

powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements
in the case of part performance thereof."
In Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575 (Utah App. 1993), this
Court noted that "transactions for the sale of realty may be
exempted from the statute of frauds where there is 'sufficient
performance on the part of [one party] exclusively referable to
the alleged contract to exempt it from the statute of frauds.'" Id.
at 580 (citing Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980)).
In Holt, the appellant alleged the parties had orally agreed
to modify their original, written real estate contract to facilitate
defendant's sale of certain real property.

The trial court granted

summary judgement because it found no written modification existed.
Id. at 578.

The Supreme Court of Utah held that plaintiff's

acceptance of substituted collateral and grant of permission for
defendant to pay off an existing loan, constituted part performance
sufficient, as a matter of law, to exempt the entire modification
from the proscriptions of the statute of frauds.

Id. at 580. The

Court found that the trial court had committed error because there
was conflicting evidence on the matter.

Id. at 579.

remanded because, similar to the present case,

The case was

there were genuine

issues of material fact.
In the present case, Appellant performed part of the oral
modification and extension by contacting a title company and setting
a closing date of the third week of March, 1995. Appellant had made
improvements to the condominium in anticipation of purchasing the
12

property. Also, as stated above, Appellant did not act to close the
transaction despite the fact that they were willing to do so before
February 15, 1995.
In Utah, the doctrine of part performance has not been
confined to a fixed, inflexible formula.
The doctrine of part performance, in the state of Utah,
has not been reduced to a formula, as it has in some of our
sister states. Thus, decisions of this court do not stay the
hand of equity in the equitable situations created by oral
contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, but the
statute is preserved and remains to serve its purpose - the
prevention of fraud and injustice.
Young v. Moore, 663 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added)(citing
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballardf

534 P.2d 611, 613-14 (Utah

1975)).
This Court should remand the case for further proceedings on
the

merits

to prevent

fraud

and

injustice because Appellant

partially performed the modification and extension.
failure

to

perform

prevented

Appellant

from

Appellees's

purchasing

the

condominium where she has lived and prevented her from the equity
and improvements to which she is entitled. These equitable doctrines
were established to prevent the type of injustice that would result
in this case if the statute of frauds is allowed to proscribe the
modification and extension of the option to purchase.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed manifest error when it failed to
recognize equitable estoppel and part performance as defenses to the
statute of frauds in Utah.

The trial court also erred by granting
13

summary judgement in a case where the affidavits and pleading
clearly

show

that

genuine

issues

of

material

fact

exist.

Additionally, the trial court erred by interpreting an incomplete
and ambiguous contract at the summary judgement stage.

Appellant

respectfully asks the Court to reverse the trial court's Summary
Judgement and remand the case to be tried on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this

\

/^^^

day of April, 1996.

nn

MATTHEW W. DR/TOJSS
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on
/ $* day of April, 1996, I mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the following address:
Jeffrey C. Swinton
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
311 South State Street, Suite #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT

I

LEASE AGREEMENT

This agreement, made and entered into, by and between Robert M.
and Donna H. Mills, the owners, hereinafter jointly referred to
as -LANDLORD" and
. N ~ w , 7 " ^ ^ /S^X
hereinafter jointly referred to as "TENANT".

WITNESSETH:
That the LANDLORD for and in consideration of the rents, covenants,
conditions, and agreements hereinafter mentioned, reserved and
contained on the part of the TENANT to be paid, kept and performed,
does by these presents grant, demise, lease and let unto TENANT
those certain premises (hereinafter "Premises") situated in the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah and more particularly described
as follows, to-wit:
1593 East 6430 South
Holladay, Utah
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto said TENANT from the /V^day of A<r/^,
1993, until the JJ±_ day of Al^r^L\99£
YIELDING AND PAYING
THEREFORE unto said LANDLORD the total sum of $ tt Z-< .<*
,
paying installments throughout said term in the form of monthly
rental in advance on the _i£lfday of each and every month oi said
term in the amount of $
(&.-<>. ^\>
.

yfiIN ADDITION to the rent due hereunder, prior to taking possession
of the Premises, TENANT shall pay LANDLORD the sum of Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) to be held by LANDLORD for as long as TENANT
occupies Premises as a security deposit for the faithful performance of TENANT'S obligations hereunder and the additional sum of
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) to be held by LANDLORD for as long
as TENANT occupies Premises as partial payment of the last month's
rent.
In no event shall the LANDLORD be obliged to apply the
security deposit upon rents or other charges in arrears or upon
damages for the TENANT'S failure to perform these covenants,
conditions, and agreements. The LANDLORD may so apply the security
deposit at its option. The LANDLORD'S right to the possession of
the leased Premises for non-payment of rents or for other reasons
shall not, in any conditions, agreement or event be affected by
reason of the fact that the LANDLORD holds these funds. Upon the
expiration of this agreement, the security deposit will be returned
to TENANT without interest when Premises are left in the condition
it was in upon the date of first occupancy.

1

COVENANTS OF THE TENANT:
Said TENANT does hereby covenant and agree with LANDLORD that it
will:
1). Timely pay all rental payments to LANDLORD by depositing
payment in the bank account specified by LANDLORD.
2). Use and occupy Premises in a careful and proper manner
for a personal residence only, and TENANT shall not create or
permit any nuisance or disturbance, nor commit any waste, nor shall
it use the Premises for any unlawful purpose, and TENANT shall
conform to and obey all present or future laws, ordinances, rules,
regulations, requirements, and orders of governmental authority,
condominium rules, regulations and bylaws respecting the use and
occupancy of demised Premises.
3).
Neither assign this lease or sublet the Premises or any
part thereof without the prior written consent of the LANDLORD.
4).
Make no alterations or additions in or to said Premises
without the prior written consent of the LANDLORD.
5).

Maintain its own personal property and theft insurance.

6).
At a^l times during the term hereof or any renewal,
protect, indemnify and save harmless the LANDLORD from any and all
claims for damages for personal injury and/or property damage
occurring on or about the Premises.
7). Accept said Premises in its present state of repair
except as herein otherwise specifically set forth, and TENANT shall
be responsible for maintenance of the interior of said Premises in
a good state of repair throughout the term of this lease. It is
understood that, except as specifically set forth on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto, ^the Premises includes no furnishings for use by
the TENANT, and TENANT shall be fully responsible to furnish the
Premises at its own expense.
Personal property belonging to
LANDLORD may be stored in a room within the Premises which shall
remain secured at all times.

( ^ c-f

8).

Pay for electricity and natural gas

9).

Be responsible for plate glass breakage.

2-^-^n)

10). Permit LANDLORD or LANDLORD'S agent at all reasonable
times to enter upon said Premises for the purpose of inspection.
12). Deliver up the Premises to the LANDLORD at the expiration
or prior termination of this lease in as good condition as when
received, excepting reasonable wear and tear and damage arising
from negligence or default of the LANDLORD or its agents.

2

COVENANTS OF THE LANDLORD:
The LANDLORD on its part covenants and agrees with TENANT that it
will pay all standard condominium maintenance fees relating to the
Premises which includes payment for sewer and water.
MUTUAL COVENANTS:
The LANDLORD and TENANT mutually covenant and agree as follows:
1).
The LANDLORD shall not be liable or accountable to said
TENANT for any damages occurring by reason of any defect in
utilities or fixtures or any defective condition on the Premises,
nor be liable for any damage occasioned by the said Premises being
out of repair, nor for any damage done or occasioned by or from
plumbing, gas, water, steam or other pipes or sewage, or the
bursting, leaking or running of any closet or plumbing or other
damage by water, ifi, above, upon or about said Premises, nor any
damage arising from any act or neglect of any co-tenant or other
occupants of the same condominium project, or of any owners or
occupants of adjoining or contiguous property.
2).
The LANDLORD shall not be liable and the TENANT hereby
waives all claims for damage that may be caused by the LANDLORD in
re-entering and taking possession of the Premises as herein provided, and all claims for damages that may result from the destruction of or injury to the Premises or building.
3).
Any holding over after
lease or any extension thereof,
of LANDLORD, shall be construed
may exercise such rights as are

the expiration of the term of this
with the prior written permission
as unlawful detainer and LANDLORD
available to it at that time.

4).
If the TENANT shall at any time be in default in payment
of rent herein reserved, or in the performance of any of the
covenants, terms, conditions or provisions of this lease, and the
TENANT shall fail to remedy such default within ten days after
written notice thereof from LANDLORD, or if TENANT should make an
assignment for the^ benefit of creditors, or have a petition in
bankruptcy filed against it, or file a petition in bankruptcy, or
if a receiver of any property of TENANT on or about the said
premises be appointed, it shall be lawful for LANDLORD to immediately terminate this lease and said lease shall not be
assignable in any process of law nor be treated as an asset of said
TENANT nor shall it pass to the control of any trustee or assignee
of TENANT by virtue of any action or proceedings. LANDLORD may in
such case, at its option, terminate this lease and re-enter upon
said Premises and repossess and enjoy same as in its first and
former estate and thereupon this lease and everything therein
contained on the part of the LANDLORD to be done and performed
shall cease and determine, without prejudice to the rights of the
LANDLORD to recover from TENANT all rent due up to the time of such
3

entry.
In case of any such default and entry by the LANDLORD,
LANDLORD may relet said Premises for the remainder of said term for
the highest rent obtainable and may recover from TENANT any
deficiency between the amount so obtained and the rent herein
reserved.
5 ) . All improvements to the property made by TENANT shall
become and remain the property of the LANDLORD at the expiration or
prior termination of this lease.
6 ) . No furniture of TENANT located on the Premises shall be
removed from the Premises unless obligations of TENANT to LANDLORD
hereunder are current, and TENANT hereby grants to LANDLORD a lien
upon such furniture to assure faithful performance by TENANT of the
terms, conditions and covenants of this lease.
7 ) . Should either party hereto or its successors default in
the performance of the covenants, conditions, term or agreements
herein contained, that party shall be liable for all costs and
expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement, or any right
or remedy arising out of the breach thereof, including costs
and a
reasonable attorney's fee, regardless of whether or not suit be
instituted.
8 ) . This lease and all of the covenants, provisions and
conditions herein contained shall inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon the successors and assigns of the LANDLORD and TENANT
of this agreement.
9 ) . The words "LANDLORD" and "TENANT", as used herein, include, apply to, and bind and benefit the heirs, executors,
personal representatives, administrators, successors and assigns of
the LANDLORD and TENANT.
10). No waiver of the right to forfeiture of this lease or reentry upon breach of any of the conditions thereof shall be deemed
a waiver of such right upon any subsequent breach of such or any
other condition.
11). TjLme is of the essence in this lease and every term,
covenant, and condition herein contained.
12). Past Due Rent Charges.
If TENANT shall fail to pay
within ten (10) days after due and payable any rent or any other
amounts or charges for which it is responsible to LANDLORD, TENANT
shall pay a late fee equal to four (4%) percent of such past due
amount, and in addition, TENANT shall pay interest from the due
date of such past due amount to the date of payment both before and
after Judgment at a rate equal to the greater of eighteen (18%)
percent per annum or four (4%) percent over "prime rate" charged by
Zion's First National Bank of Utah at the due date of such payment;
provided, however, that in any case the maximum amount or rate of
interest to be charged shall not exceed the maximum non-usurious
4

rate in accordance with applicable law.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said parties have hereunto set their hands and
seals on this
9^
day of
rV/y/u/ci/.,
, 1993.
LANDLORD:
Robert M. Mills

Donna H. Mills
TENANT:
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ADDENDUM A
OPTION TO PURCHASE
"Purchaser" shall retain for a period of twenty four months,
commencing February 15th, 1993, an option to purchase the real
property located at 1593 East 6430 South, Holladay, Utah, for the
sum of One Hundred Fifty Five Thousand and no/100 ($155,000.)
Payments made during the term of the lease /hall be applied, in the
event that the purchase is completed, $7^hr00 towards the principal
and $jr, 0-25 towards , interest, taxes, insurance, and association

This addendum is hereby incorporated in to and made an integral
part of the attached lease agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, saixl parties have hereunto set their hands and
seals on this
^^<
day of
-y^ld^/y"
r 1993.

^^

~?/%/^

^

Owher/RoHert Mi Mxlls

Owner/Donna H. Mills

Purchaser

Tab 2

EXKlCiT
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Febiuaiy 10, 1995
Robert and Donna Mills
Route One
Box 305
South Royaiton, Vermont
U5038
Dear Mr and Mrs. Miiis.
I hope you enjoyed your mission, and I trust that you wiii have a pleasant tour of the country on
your way back to Sait Lake. Have you decided wheie you're going to caii home'
I just wanted to iet you know that we wiii be exceicismg our option to puiciia^e me
condominium You had mentioned an attorney mat wouici assist m the closing, etc
L apoiagize,
i iiave iost that information If you or he couio caii me at 277-20 iO (jiome oirice; or 2o6-3 i 17
(regular business hours) and advise if you have a piererence of title companies, closing dates,
etc i would appreciate it it wouid probably be a good idea to spend some time on the phone
(n»\.«

•»\_«Ai.\.

W*«.
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L/VU H V l « t U t

J

\J X-. ^IkSS
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M.li.

Vli»\.<

»_ I w l U l i ^

J- V« ^J >^1 \J

l\. l»%.

%.!!.._ t v t l i ^ v

J.

Mill

available at your iiesure for this; an evening would be ideal, (if you caii mi* mun>day thiough
Saturday, we wiii be in Park City at 801 645 8496 ;
In terms of the purchase, we can do this anywhere from now to the time mat vou get back to
town piease iet me know what best suits youi needs (i e ,since you re ietui ning on March 23rd,
if vou would like the closing to coincide with that Gate, that is line with me in this case we
wouid pro rate an additional three weeks of the iease if you would like to wrap mat pait up
immediately, that is 0 K to, and i wouid be happy to assist with naving youi wateiueci, liidge, and
other furniture moved to a storage unit for a montn ox so )
Jana and i have appreciated living here and nope mat you enjoy youi new Pome, v ncrevci mat
might be1
1 iook foiward to talking to vou soon,

5inceieiy,

AiiM/

Tab 3
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EXHIBIT
MATTHEW W. DRIGGS #6085
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
1300 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2093
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF PAT BRODY

:

Civil No. 950901852CV

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JANA JEAN BRODY,

:

Defendant.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

JANA JEAN BRODY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,

:

Counterdefendants.

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
PAT BRODY, being

first

duly

sworn, deposes

and

says

as

follows:
1.

I am of legal age and am competent to testify in this

matter.
2.

I have personal knowledge that the facts stated herein

are true and correct.

3.

I am married to the defendant, Jana Jean Brody.

4.

On or about the

3rd day of February,

1993, my wife

entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs herein.

At the

time said lease agreement was signed, an option to purchase the
condominium was extended and consideration was paid for the option
to purchase the condominium.
5.

Prior to the signing of the lease agreement with an

option to purchase, there was a very clear understanding between
the parties that plaintiffs, at all relevant times, intended to
sell the condominium and not return to the condominium after their
mission.
6.
option

In July of 1994, my wife and I considered exercising the
and,

thereto.

in fact, we

contacted

the plaintiffs

with

regard

At that time, we indicated to plaintiffs that we would

either purchase the property or, in the alternative, we would
purchase the property and sell it out of escrow to an interested
third party.

It was anticipated that this would be accomplished

prior to the 15th day of February, 1995.
7.

On or about the 9th day of February, 1995, my wife and I

decided to exercise the option to purchase the condominium.

On or

about the 9th day of February, 1995, acting on behalf of my wife
and with her express authority, I had a telephone conversation with
Mr.

Robert M. Mills.

During

said telephone

conversation, an

unconditional acceptance of the offer to purchase the condominium
for the term stated in the option agreement was given.

At that

time, I stated that my wife and I could close the transaction at
2

any time.

Mr. Mills acknowledged the acceptance, and a bilateral

contract was formed regarding the sale of the property.
8.

During said telephone conversation, Mr. Mills stated that

he would not be in town because of his mission, and he asked that
the closing on the sale of the property
returned to Salt Lake City, Utah.

be delayed

until he

I agreed with Mr. Mills to close

the sale of the condominium on or about the 21st day of March,
1995, when the plaintiffs would be in town.
reached as to the closing.

An agreement was

I then reguested Mr. Mills to inform me

as to his preference of title company, closing venue, etc.
9.

At the time of said telephone conversation, there was no

misunderstanding that the option had been exercised to purchase the
condominium and that the closing of the sale of the condominium
would take place on or about the week of the 21st day of March,
1995.
10.

After

the

telephone

conversation,

I acknowledged

in

writing the telephone conversation, which was sent via overnight
priority Federal Express mail on or about the 12th day of February,
1995.
11.

^t some point thereafter, I contacted a title company and

arranged for said title company to begin the closing procedures so
that the closing could take place. Relying upon the representation
that plaintiffs made on the 9th day of February, 1995, I contacted
the

real

estate

agent

in

connection

with

the

sale

of

the

condominium and informed him to proceed toward closing on or about
the

21st

day

of

March,

1995.
3

I

also

began

making

other

preparations

to purchase

the condominium

as set forth

in the

telephone call and the letter.
12.

At some point, plaintiffs decided that they would not

sell the property and informed me that they would not comply with
the

agreement

as

set

forth

in

the

option

and

the

telephone

conversation of the 9th day of February, 1995.
13.

At all times, I believe that I properly exercised the

option to purchase the condominium on behalf of my .wife.

We

accepted the outstanding offer prior to the expiration of the
option.

At

the

time

of

the

telephone

conversation

and

the

subseguent letter, my wife and I had the ability to perform under
the option agreement.
option, we

At all times since the exercising of the

have desired

to purchase

the

consideration for the option to do so.
were not tendered

prior to the

condominium

and paid

The only reason that funds

15th day of February,

1995 is

because of the request of the plaintiffs, who would not be in town
to close the transaction.
14.
been

Since the 9th day of February, 1995, my wife and I have

ready

and

willing

to

proceed

with

the

purchase

of

the

condominium.
DATED this "?L)T— day of May, 1995.

ff2 / /%Jy
PATlfeRODY

y

/

On this "2C/Z2 day of May, 1995, personally appeared before me
PAT BRODY, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the foregoing

4

Affidavit, and he stated that he has read the same and knows the
contents thereof to be true and correct.
My commission expires:

r
S

""" NOTAR7PU3LJC"""

/££$&

/
^
£y //""V^i
Notary Public // /
Residing at Sa±t Lake County, Utah

I

MATTHEW W DRIGGS •

| /$$£>!& 7050 SOUTH UNION PARK AVE #420 I
\*S**ll7
MDVALE.UT 84047
•
| N 5 J ^ My Commission Expires May 11,1997 I
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Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON

j!3n?*H^SS
I ** *» ^ ^ * - * » - * * *

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 359-4000

JUL 2 6 1995
By.

n

bAUrt LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Ctork

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,

:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT" / '*'V)

:

Case No.950901852 CV -

Plaintiffs,
vs .

N

—'

IU
Wilkinson/'
j

JANA JEAN BRODY,

:

Judge Homer F.

Defendant.

JANA JEAN BRODY,

:

Counterclaimant,

:

vs .
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,

:

Counterdefendants.

:

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for Hearing on
the 17th day of July, 1995.

Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey

C. Swinton of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton, and Defendant, Jana
Jean Brody, was represented by Matthew W. Driggs of the law firm of
Armstrong, Rawlings & West.
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the
Memoranda of the parties, HEREBY FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

In June of 1994, the Brodys notified the Mills of their

intent to exercise their Option.
2.

In response thereto, the Mills granted a limited power
1

of attorney to their attorney, Jeffrey C. Swinton, to close the
transaction.
3.

The Mills then notified the Brodys in a letter dated June

14, 1994, that Mr. Swinton had been appointed their attorney to
close the transaction on their behalf.
4.

The Brodys were unable to perform on their own and in

desperation, listed the property for sale.
5.

The Option to Purchase was drafted by Pat Brody, husband

to Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, and in the case of ambiguity will be
interpreted against the Brodys.
6.

The Option required payment of the entire purchase price

within the Option period.
7.

The Brodys did not timely exercise the Option.

8.

The Brodys are without clean hands, having never tendered

payment of the purchase price before the expiration of the Option
period or any rental payments directly to the Mills or into escrow
after March 15, 1995.
9.

The Lease has expired and the Brodys have unlawfully held

over possession.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Brodys shall vacate the condominium before August 1,

2.

In the event the Brodys fail to vacate on or before that

1995.

date, they may be evicted.
3.

If there is any waste to the condominium as a result of

this Order, there will be an additional element of damages awarded
2

in favor of the Mills.
4.

The Brodys are to pay the Mills rent at the rate of

$1,150.00 per month from the 15th day of March, 1995, until the
31st day of July when the condominium is to be vacated and those
rents shall be trebled under the law.

The Judgment for rental

damages therefore, is for 4 1/2 months rent in the total amount of
$5,175.00, with such damages trebled in accordance with the law, to
total $15,525.00. A supplemental award of damages shall- be granted
should the Brodys remain in occupancy beyond July 31, 1995.
5.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a further judgment against

Defendant for their attorney's fees in the amount of $5,508.50 and
Court costs in the amount of $382.50.
6.

Any security deposit held by the Mills shall be refunded

to or deducted from the judgment at the time of payment.
THEREFORE, a total judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, in the amount of
$21,416.00 with interest accruing thereon from the date of judgment
until paid in full at the statutory rate of 9.22% per annum.

It is

further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in enforcing the
provisions of the

judgment and in collecting

said

judgment by

execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this Ji '

day of July, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

/Homer F . W i l k i n s o n , D i s t r i c t J u d g e

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e f o r e g o i n g
Summary J u d g m e n t was TRANSMITTED VIA FACSIMILE, t h i s _ J T ~ o f J u l y ,
1995, t o t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Matthew W. D r i g g s
A r m s t r o n g , R a w l i n g s and West
1300 W a l k e r C e n t e r
175 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
F a c s i m i l e # 359-2125
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Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)359-4 000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,
Plaintiffs,
vs .
JANA JEAN BRODY,
Defendant.
JANA JEAN BRODY,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MILLS
Case No. 950901852 CV

Counterclaimant,
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
vs .
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H.
MILLS,
Counterdefendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNT OF SALT LAKE

)
ss
)

COMES NOW Robert M. Mills, a Plaintiff in the above entitled
action, being duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I am Robert M. Mills, a Plaintiff in the above entitled

action.
2.

On the third day of February 1993 my wife and I leased our

condominium to Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, until the first day of

March, 1995, when we planned to return home from a mission for our
church and reToccupy our condominium.
3.

Jana Jean Brody's husband, Pat Brody refused to allow his

wife to sign the Lease without an Option to Purchase being m^de a
part thereof.

4.

Therefore, Mr. Brody drafted and attached a on^ oige

We specifically set the date for exercise of the o p ^ o n io

be February 15, 1995, knowing that my wife and I would need cash in
hand to find a new home immediately upon our arrival.
5.

It was always our understanding of the option to purchase

drafted by Mr. Brody that payment of $155,000.00 in cash less any
credit given for any rental payments made would be received in our
hands no later than February 15, 1995.
6. Sometime before June 14, 1994, Pat Brody contacted me by
telephone and told me he desired to exercise the option to purchase
the condominium being leased by his wife.
7.

On or about the 9th day of June of 1994 my wife and I

signed a power of attorney appointing Jeffrey C. Swinton as our
attorney-in-fact to "sign and otherwise execute any and all legal
documents relative to the sale of our condominium located at 159 3
East 6430 South, in Holladay, Utah".

A copy of that Power of

Attorney is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A".
8.

On the 14th day of June of 1994 I sent a letter to Mr. and

Mrs. Pat Brody telling them that I had engaged Mr. Swinton to
represent

us in the transaction

and that he had been given a

limited power of attorney to close the sale in our absence.
of

that

letter

is attached

to the Memorandum

filed

A copy

with

this

affidavit.
9.

No further contact was made by Mr. Brody with me or my

attorney until December of 1994 when Mr. Brody contacted me once
again and indicated

his desire to purchase the condominium in

January, 1995, and said he was attempting to obtain financing.
-.0.

Lariy in liit i.icnth OL , ebruary oi 1^ J^ ni. Brody callea

me once again and indicated to me that he had been unable to obtain
financing to purchase the condominium.
11.

The

Brodys

have

informed

me

that

they

listed

our

condominium for sale with Gary Larsen of Coldwell Banker in Ft.
Union Plaza and that they have shown the home in open houses at
least during the month of February of 1995.
12.

In February of 1995 I told Mr. Brody on the phone that he

and his wife could stay in the condominium until March 15, 1995 and
they paid rent up to and including that date.
13.

The Brodys continue to occupy our condominium and have

only paid rent through March 15, 1995.
14.

The lease agreement has expired and we have been required

to rent an apartment until our condominium is vacated and we can
move home once again.
Dated this

/rf ~<3av of May, 199

^ ^

^ u ^>

-fa-

•

Robert M. Mills
Subscribed and sworn before me this
V-T^-f
, 1995.

My Commission Expires:

t6

~ (^

TlSfek
V6\ (fb^jfi
J?j
V^&ifw/?'/

\^

day of
^

NOTARY/PJEJfiKlC

.cr^ri-.
J1

Residing it ^

' ^ u u , h s t n i e Strcot. • :0>:
'^\ Lako Cily. Utah 0-: Hi

'j

«

i-l U (x C ^ T

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the

V2- - day of May,

1995, the foregoing Affidavit was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:

Jana Jean Brody
1593 East 6430 South
Holladay, Utah 84121
Matthew W. Driggs
Armstrong, Rawlings & West
1300 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^^/

